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Abstract
Complex control tasks involving human operators involve increasingly complex
automation. Despite the advanced design of these systems, a disconnect between
the pilot and the state of the automation can lead to confusion and potentially
loss of control. Recognizing this shortcoming and its negative effects allows us
to design systems which construct this channel of communication and increase
overall awareness of system state. This thesis presents a display system designed
for use with the Flight Envelope Protection system. We present our both our
design, and initial results from a pilot study performed at the Illinois Simulator
Laboratory.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A variety of control tasks exist which require a complex interaction between a
human operator, a computational automation system, and some physical object.
For example, we may think of tasks as complex as nuclear power plant manage-
ment and flight traffic control, or as simple as cruise control on a vehicle. These
tasks are distinguished by the three major components in the system: cyber,
physical, and human. A task such as driving a vehicle in full manual control
excludes the cyber component, while a fully autonomous robotic vacuum would
exclude the human.
When thinking about the actors in this definition, it’s easy to come up with
shortcomings. Human operators are prone to mistakes from lack of experience,
fatigue, or distraction. Conversely, computers make different types mistakes.
Aeronautics literature is full of fully automated flight systems responding to
environmental disturbances or malfunctions in an incorrect way, leading to loss
of control. Systems may fail due to problems such as hardware failure or insuf-
ficient testing.
For single actor systems, improvement is one-sided. Software improvements
or user training are aimed at overcoming flaws inherent in either system. How-
ever, cyber-physical-human systems introduce an important element to the
problem, the juncture between the two. We believe that, by focusing on de-
signing fully integrated cyber-physical-human system, the shortcomings of both
of these actors can limited in a way that draws on strengths of each. The goal
of this project is to design a flight system which can be used to leverage infor-
mation found in powerful automation systems in a way that a human operator
can both remain aware system state, and respond to unexpected events. An
increase in situational awareness both of the aircraft and automation systems
should allow the pilot to perform at higher levels.
This work is specifically focused on the task of aircraft control. While the
interface and assessment provided in this thesis are specific to this domain, it is
our ultimate goal to present design choices that can be used to inform work in
other cyber-physical-human control tasks. Additionally, the work focuses on the
use of a flight automation system that was originally designed and developed
independently of this work. The focus of this work is largely concerned with
evaluating the impact our designs had on the human operators.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 “Automation Surprise”
Conceptually this work draws from a variety of sources and attempts to address
several shortcomings of automation that have become increasingly problematic.
In particular, the fact that the ubiquitous nature of highly advanced automation
has led to a degradation of pilot performance. This degradation stems largely
from a lack of engagement with the task at hand. Automation systems allow
pilots to ignore large parts of the overall task leading to “mind wandering” [7].
This can be described as an ‘out-of-the-loop’ (Endsley & Kirlik, 1995) or an
‘out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity’ [31] problem. During routine flights, the pilot
may disengage with the control loop entirely, only reengaging at specified times
and for highly specific tasks. This phenomenon stands alongside overall skill
degradation that may result from such removal from the task.
While this reliance on automation may be adequate in many basic situations,
even the most advanced automation systems have failure points. When major
failures occur at these moments the pilot is forced back into manual control
of the aircraft. This jolting back into the control loop has been described as
“automation surprise” [5] or “return-to-manual-control deficit” [16]. The speed
at which a pilot must reengage with the task coupled with the complexity of
a situation deemed ‘to difficult’ for the automation can result in an incorrect
action which may result in failure. Considering the fact that many of these
failures occur during events that would already be challenging even for a fully
prepared pilot, it should come as no surprise that this type of jolting back to
awareness causes loss of control.
One solution to this problem may be the engineering of control systems which
completely obviate the need for a human operator at all. Certainly this is the
approach high-tech firms are taking to the challenge of creating a self-driving
car. Indeed, some popular prototypes do away with a steering wheel and pedals
entirely. This solves the “return-to-manual-control deficit” problem by removing
the need to return to manual control. While advances in sensor engineering and
control software make this future a clear possibility in certain domains, the
danger of insufficient automation persists in others. In these areas, bridging the
communication gap between skilled operators and advanced automation remains
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a critical question.
Another possible solution to this problem could be motivated from a distrust
of automation. Perhaps automation merely presents the facade of safety while
luring us to lean more heavily on what is ultimately an unreliable support.
Removing entirely the cyber component of these systems solves the “return-
to-manual-control deficit” problem by ensuring the pilot never leaves manual
control. If the pilot remains continually in the control state nothing, save gross
negligence, could remove them from “the loop”. However, this ultimately deval-
ues the huge advances that have been made in control engineering, and unneces-
sarily burdens operators with tasks they no longer need to complete. Certainly
it is the case that control systems used appropriately and within their limits of
automation have the ability to dramatically decrease overall workload.
This approach is addressed by D. A. Norman, in a paper on over-automation
[26]. Here, he presents a clarifying example that motivates our work and pro-
vides a helpful way of thinking about ideal automation interaction. He asks the
reader to imagine a pilot flying an aircraft with the help of a human co-pilot.
During the course of the flight, a small problem grows steadily larger, with the
potential for catastrophic failure if not addressed. The co-pilot, who finds that
they are making increasingly large adjustments to keep the plane level mentions
to the pilot in a casual way that they notice something off. This prompts the
pilot to investigate the problem further, eventually identifying and addressing
the root problem. Norman contrasts this scenario with one in which the pilot
relies not on a human co-pilot, but an automation system. In many ways, for
the pilot, this is a similar interaction. That is, certain flight tasks are completely
oﬄoaded, and their role becomes largely a supervisory one. However, given the
same failure, the automation may continue to slowly adjust and keep the plane
level. This continues until the failure exceeds automation tolerances, and the
pilot is given control of an out-of-control aircraft. The difference between these
two thought experiments is not the way in which the pilot delegates work to
another agent, but rather, the lack of appropriate feedback. A co-pilot acting
similar to automation would silently sit while doing their job, finally throwing
their hands up in exhaustion, and exclaiming, “I can’t do this anymore!” Cer-
tainly this type of behavior would not be tolerated out of a human subject, so
why would a similar method of action be allowed in automation? It is not the
system (co-pilot or automation) but the lack of feedback that ultimately results
in lower pilot awareness.
This observation encourages future research to focus on bridging the gap
between the actions of a human co-pilot and those of an automation system.
Construed more broadly, our project looks at the ways in which certain types
of machines communicate not only their actions, but also their ‘motivations’ to
human partners. Re-instituting what Norman refers to as “informal chatter”.
Chatter relating to automation is a way in which pilots can become more aware
of the system as a whole. Ideally, this more comprehensive view of system state
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will lead to informed decisions that utilize more of the pilot’s expert knowledge.
2.2 Mode Confusion
Several high-profile aviation accidents also help to inform the need for this type
of design and research. In the motivating incidents, there is a common thread
of a flight crew’s inability to correctly assess the true state of the aircraft and
automation. This lack of understanding leads to a misdiagnoses of important
issues, which in turn causes crews to take incorrect actions to resolve problems
leading to overall loss of control.
In the case of Air France flight 447, growing sensor inconsistencies were
not reported to the flight crew until the autopilot moved beyond operational
limits and disconnected [15]. Fitting perfectly into Norman’s “informal chatter”
model, the crew were unable to recover after this disconnect leading to a stall
which resulted in the deaths of all on board.
Several cases result in incident due to the method of automation action being
unclear to the flight crew. Although the automation may technically be working
correctly, it operates in a way inconsistent with crew expectation resulting in
loss of control. Both Asiana Airlines flight 214 [3] and Scandinavian Airlines
flight 751 [1] suffered from this type of misunderstanding.
Finally, in an incident similar to Air France 447, American Eagle flight 4184
crashed after the pilot took control of the aircraft from automation without
an understanding of the constricted safety boundaries due to ice buildup [2].
Lack of information regarding the safe operational limits of the aircraft were
unavailable, and the unexpected behavior of the automation were contributing
factors to the ultimate crash.
While in most of these cases there are additional confounding factors such as
icing or strong winds, the roll of automation mode confusion and pilot disconnect
should not be discounted. Advancements in display design can help the flight
crew build a more truthful model of the aircraft and ultimately make more
informed decisions to solve problems.
2.3 Ecological Design
Our work is influenced partly by principles of ecological interface design (EID).
While we did not complete a full cognitive work analysis, we nevertheless draw
similarities between this work and our own. In a handbook on EID, Catherine
Burns states, “The priorities of EID are to provide complete information, show
constraints in work environment, show the information as visually as possible,
and provide support for different work behaviors” [6]. As we move into the
discussion of our system design, these ideas should become more salient. When
looking at interfaces designed in an EID framework, a point of commonality is
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Figure 2.1: The interface presented in Seppelt and Lee [27] for displaying the
interaction of speed and following distance for a pair of moving cars. The display
informs the driver in the follow position of the automatic cruise controls safe
operational limits.
either one or a set of moving shapes whose defining points are mapped to key
system variables. The desired effect of this approach is that users will recognize
the information found in the emergent shapes. That is, the information is found
not only in the direct viewing of a set of system variables, but recognizing how
their relationships define overall state. For example, in a 2007 paper by Seppelt
and Lee [27], a display for driving vehicles is discussed which maps stopping and
following distances into a trapezoidal or triangular display screen. The intended
emergent behavior of this display is to transition between a triangle or trapezoid
to reflect the change in distance between the two vehicles. (Seen in figure 2.1.)
This is augmented with dashed boundaries which indicate the available limits of
the automatic cruise control given road conditions and stopping power. Rather
than simply providing raw data to the driver as a dial or readout, this design
focuses on exploring the information found in the relationships between pieces
of data.
2.4 The Lens Model
Our work is also informed by the work of early 20th century psychologist Egon
Brunswik. While his original work was largely focused on understanding the
behavior of individual organisms in their environment, subsequent researchers
have expanded upon his work and explained its relation to a variety of fields.
In particular, focus on the Brunswikian lens model and the way in which this
model informs our designs.
For Brunswik, the lens model is a representation of the “functional unit of
behavior”, and describes the both the passive and active interaction an organ-
ism has with an outside environment. This interaction is mediated through
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judgments about the environment that are probabilistically weighted. The ul-
timate achievement of an organism can therefore be thought of as a correlation
between the external environment and the performance of the organism.
Situational
State
O X2
X1
Xn
Y
Operator’s
Judgements
Achievement
Information
(Cues)Situation
Operator
Figure 2.2: The Brunswikian lens model. Modeled from diagram in Kirlik and
Strauss, 2006 [24].
While he initially focused on understanding organism judgment in uncertain
circumstances, the original lens model was developed further into the lens model
equation, which describes overall achievement in situation as the same type of
bivariate correlation, mediated through a set of informational cues.
This conception of the lens model can be found in figure 2.2. Here we
see a basic task divided between the situation on the left hand side and the
operator on the right. A given situation state (O) is mediated through the
cues (x1 . . . xn) to ultimately resulting in an operator judgment (Y ). Lowered
performance can result from a lack of correlation between the situation and the
provided information or between the information and the actions taken by a
subject.
We can conceive of this overall achievement as relating to overall situational
awareness. Kirlik and Strauss [24], “construe SA [situational awareness] as
the ability to render accurate judgments about the external environment or
controlled system”. Conceiving of our project in these terms allows us to set
of goal of increasing pilot situational awareness through mediating cues. In the
flight domain, the situation state refers to the given state of the aircraft and
automation systems, the cues are the interface panel items, outside view, and
sounds (in a non-simulated aircraft this would also include vestibular sensing,
i.e., changes in momentum). The final judgment of the situation would be
measured based on the pilot’s direct actions in piloting the aircraft.
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Chapter 3
Flight Envelope Protection
System
The Integrated Reconfigurable Controller for Vehicle Resilience (iReCoVeR) is a
control architecture designed to prevent loss of control events in transport class
aircraft, and is part of a larger collaborative project between the University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (UIUC) and the University of Connecticut
(UConn). At a high level, this system is designed to predict, detect, and prevent
LoC along the chain of flight control. This is discretized into what can be termed
a collection of modules, working together to complete this complex task. One
of these components is the flight envelope protection (FEP) system. While
automation system design is not the focus of this thesis, a clear understanding
of the basics of operation are necessary to understand the design of the interface
panels. Full details of the technical implementation can be found in Chongvisal
et al. [9].
Figure 3.1: The iReCoVeR control architecture. Note the Flight Envelope Pro-
tection module in orange as part of the larger task of LoC prevention.
The flight envelope protection (FEP) system is based on a a quantitative
definition of loss of control based on the work of Wilborn and Foster [32]. This
conception of control is based in three predefined two-dimensional ’envelopes’
that can be calculated for certain critical flight parameters.
As an example, we could conceive of such envelopes for a car based on vehicle
speed and the angle off-center of the front wheels. This envelope would contain
7
(a) Adverse Aerodynamics (b) Unusual Attitude (c) Structural Integrity
Figure 3.2: Loss of control envelopes used in [9] for the FEP system developed
for NASA’s TCM. (Solid blue: loss-of-control limits; solid red: absolute limits.)
all of the ’safe’ pairs of values. We would expect then that a 45 degree angle
while traveling at 10mph would be safe, while the same turn at 70mph would
prove disastrous. While the envelopes used in the FEP system are more complex
than this, the same general principle applies.
Each of the envelopes has two borders, a more restrictive loss-of-control limit,
and an absolute limit that indicates absolute operational limits for the aircraft.
These two types are referred to as soft and hard limits respectively. These are
seen as nested blue soft limits and outer red hard limits in figure 3.2. Flying
beyond either of these two limits can be potentially very dangerous.
Maintaining control of the system therefor becomes a task of ensuring that
these critical envelopes are not exceeded. The system does this by limiting
pilot control in situations where the directed actions of the pilot would take the
aircraft outside a control envelope. In these situations, the system determines
that closest possible ’safe command’ to the pilot’s directed command and uses
this modified command to direct the aircraft. In level flight with no external
forces, this ensures that the plane will not leave the soft or hard envelopes.
(Note that external winds may indeed push the aircraft beyond limits even with
the influence of the FEP system.) When the pilot is directing a command that
keeps the plane inside the safety envelopes, the FEP system will have no effect
on the control of the aircraft, the system only engages when an excursion is
imminent.
It should be noted that this type of automation is clearly distinct from a
full auto-pilot system which maintains total control of the aircraft at a desired
position for a portion of the flight. Using the FEP system, it is entirely possible
to command the aircraft into a steady downward path as long as the command
falls within the bounds for maintaining control.
This operational pattern has the effect of making safety envelopes not just
mathematical constructions, but visceral barriers on aircraft movement. For
example, with the FEP disabled, pitching down hard with the yoke has the
8
effect of putting the aircraft into a nose dive. However, with FEP on the same
yoke movement has the effect of starting the aircraft into a descent, but quickly
capping the angle of descent, as movement beyond that angle would cause an
envelope excursion.
The system protects against excursions in angle of attack, angle of sideslip,
pitch angle, bank angle, vertical load factor, airspeed (or dynamic pressure), and
total specific energy. It is designed to allow for selective envelope enforcement,
in other words, protection of a subset of these variables is allowed. In the
remainder of the work presented in this thesis, any reference to the FEP system
refers to the entire system being activated.
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Chapter 4
Interface Design
4.1 Motivations
Our interface design is motivated by confusion regarding the state of the au-
tomation system during flight. Initial testing of the FEP system excluded any
indication to the pilot regarding the activation state of automation. One result
of this is that pilots could ’test’ the aircraft before the critical portion of the
scenario began to determine which condition they were currently flying. This
knowledge stopped them from being ’caught unaware’ when their control au-
thority was limited later in the trial. Additionally, pilots considered certain
interactions as a “loss of control” when in fact, the FEP system modified the
pitch of the aircraft to prevent a stall (a true loss of control). This lack of aware-
ness is one of our primary motivations in our interface design. Increasing the
pilot’s situational awareness of not only the aircraft state, but automation state
should result in the ability to make more informed decisions, and consequently,
better performance. Additionally, even in cases where the automation system
may be disabled, and the pilot is in full manual control of the aircraft, informa-
tion on computed safety envelopes may allow the pilot to recognize when their
commands are leading to unsafe conditions.
Figure 4.1: The primary flight display presented in Cox, Cunningham, and
Jordan [10]. Note the green status markers, in particular on the roll scale.
The primary flight display panel we present is influenced by the layout of the
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panel for the NASA AirSTAR vehicle [10]. This heads-up primary flight display
(figure 4.1) shows green ranges along key flight parameters in order to keep pilots
aware of target conditions. While these ranges are not based in automation
feedback, conceptually, the creation of target ranges along these parameters is
very similar. One major modification was moving the display to a heads-down
configuration, as all of our evaluation flights preclude the use of outside visuals.
Similar displays have also been used to display the overall energy of the aircraft.
These displays indicate aircraft state based on the amount of total energy in the
system, which is determined by altitude and speed. Changing aircraft state can
be thought of as ’trading’ between these two values. A pilot can ’bleed off’ speed
by climbing or can gain speed (and reduce the risk of stalling) by descending.
This energy based display influences our work as it provides the user with an
understanding of the limitations on control authority.
4.2 Display Augmentation
Our interface takes the form two major additions to the standard flight panel.
While each shows information regarding the status of the FEP envelopes, this
information is provided in two distinct ways. We think of this distinction in
terms of aircraft state vs. control authority. The former is concerned with un-
derstanding how the current state of the aircraft (as defined by flight parameters
such as roll, pitch, altitude, speed, etc.) relates to envelopes. The latter with
the relationship between pilot input and envelope state. It is certainly true that
these two are closely related, but in some cases, relating envelopes to pilot input
may be more helpful, particularly in loss of control situations.
The standard panel consists of an attitude indicator, airspeed indicator, al-
timeter, heading indicator and vertical speed indicator. The attitude indicator
is modeled directly from a Rockwell Collins EFIS-700 unit. The indicator con-
sists of a static set of wings indicating aircraft position and moving horizon line
which shows degrees of roll and pitch. We use standard coloring which displays
the sky as a light blue and the ground as a light brown. The altimeter, airspeed,
and heading indicators are all of similar design. A static black indicator box
shows the current value for each of these instruments. Underneath these boxes,
moving tapes show the surrounding range of values. The airspeed indicator
includes a candy cane striped stall speed warning on the lower extreme of the
speed range. The vertical speed indicator is on the far right of the display and
shows a range of values for positive and negative rate of change measured in
ft/min. Unlike the surrounding displays, current status is shown by a moving
marker. This white chevron moves up and down the scale, extending a white
rectangle behind it. This has the effect of making the display more noticeable
when the rate of change is larger. The final component of the unaltered dis-
play is an angle of attack stall warning indicator. This light turns on when the
measured angle of attack goes beyond its critical value. This is the standard,
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unaltered display. In the experimental section, when we refer to the standard
display, these components are what we refer to.
Figure 4.2: The standard display panel with labeled envelope limit augmenta-
tions (in yellow).
The first of our additions is a set of augmentations to the standard flight
instrumentation panel. There are two modifications to the original panel as well
as three additional indicators. A labeled figure of these additions can be seen in
figure 4.2.These can be distinguished by the fact that the range of values are in
a yellow font. The first of these is an angle of sideslip indicator directly above
the heading indicator. Sideslip is the angle of difference between the relative
wind and the longitudinal centerline of the aircraft. This can be thought of
as the amount of lateral force exert on structures such as the vertical tail fin.
Excessive sideslip is problematic not only for the structural load it causes on
some portions of the aircraft, but also due to the fact that it decreases the
amount of wind passing over the main wing of the aircraft, decreasing lift.
Directly to the left of the attitude indicator an angle of attack indicator is
added. This indicator measures the angle between the relative wind and the
average cord line of the aircraft wing. That is, it measures the angle of deflec-
tion the plane is at relative to oncoming wind. This measurement is directly
related to lift, and provides a good indication of the sufficiency of lift provided.
For example, participants of the trials described below were informed that the
aircraft they were piloting had a critical angle of 14 degrees. The final added
indicator is to the right of the attitude indicator and measures g-load in the
z-axis. This can be thought of as the force that is felt with the plane pitches up-
wards. Excessive g-load forces can severely compromise the structural integrity
of the aircraft. Each of these indicators works in the same fashion as the ver-
tical speed indicator. That is, a white chevron indicating current status moves
along a static tape. A white rectangle is drawn from the neutral position (0 for
angle measurement, 1 for g-force) to the current status. Like the vertical speed
indicator, the size of this rectangle represents the magnitude of the deviation.
All of the added information, as well as the standard information panels
display information regarding aircraft state, that is, none of the information
relates directly to what the automation is doing. It would be possible to add
these display items to an aircraft that did not use the FEP system. FEP specific
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information comes in the form of the final modification to the main display panel
is the addition of ’limit’ markers around several key components on the screen.
These take the form of paired yellow bars that are positioned along the axis of
information. These markers are added to six of the flight variables: speed, angle
of attack, angle of side slip, pitch, roll, and load-factor. All markers operate in
a very similar fashion. There are two yellow bars: one that runs parallel to the
major axis of the display component, and a perpendicular end-cap. This latter
bar indicates the hard limit, while former shows the soft limit and it’s distance
from the hard limit. For most of the displays, these indicators are present on
both lower and upper limits. For speed, the lower limit is displayed using the
standard red and white candy-cane only.
These indicators alert the pilot to envelope excursions by switching the hard
limit marker from a yellow bar to a red bar when the soft limit has been ex-
ceeded. This draws the pilot’s attention to the specific flight variable that is
beyond tolerance. Based on the pilot’s expertise and training, this display may
prove sufficient to diagnose and fix a potential issue.
Just as the envelopes change, these indicators are dynamic and may change
as the aircraft state changes. For example, when the speed of the aircraft is
higher, the safe position for angle of side slip narrows. Additionally, there are
situations where the hard and soft limits converge on each other. In these cases,
the indicator may narrow to show only the hard-limit bar. The limits represent
in a very real way the envelopes used in the loss of control calculations. This
display moves these ideas from mathematical constructs to tangible boundaries.
4.3 Flight Envelope Protection Display
The second addition to the standard flight display is directly to the right be-
tween the primary flight display and the EPR, flap, and spoiler gauges. This
display is referred to as the Flight Envelope Protection display (pictured in fig-
ure 4.3, and provides a direct visualization of the way in which the envelopes
computed by the FEP system map onto pilot controls. This is in contrast to
the previously discussed components, which displayed envelope limits as they
relate to aircraft parameters. This distinction, while at first glance somewhat
insignificant, is in fact fairly significant. The previous display relies upon pilot
experience and skill to determine which control actions will optimally protect
endangered envelopes. The FEP display presents this information directly. This
is the aforementioned distinction between aircraft state and control authority.
So while this information is calculated by the same tool and relates to the same
construct of envelopes, different users may attend in different amounts to the
displays.
The main focus of the right hand display screen is the main square panel
in the middle. This panel functions as a graph which displays two pieces of
information: roll command and pitch command. These are the commands given
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Figure 4.3: The Flight Envelope Protection Display components shown in the
FEP On setting with no envelope excursions. Note here how blue and green
markers are overlapping.
by movement of the main control yoke. All yoke positions are directly mapped
to the x-y plane. The display is marked by a cross-hair marker which helps to
indicate the center point. This point represents the neutral, untouched position
of the control yoke. Rolling from left to right is graphed along the x-axis of the
plane, and pitching up and down is graphed along the y-axis.
This display has two operational modes, which are discussed in detail below.
In both of these modes the same colors and markers are used. First, a circular
blue marker outlined in white indicates the pilot commanded input. This is
directly tied to the control yoke and serves as an orientation point for use of the
display. The pilot can directly move this marker by moving the yoke. A larger
green circle marker is used to indicate the FEP derived safest position. That is,
the position the has FEP determined is optimal for ensuring a loss of control
does not occur. During safe flight, the two markers will be at the same point,
resulting a blue circle with a green halo. A discrepancy between the green dot
and the blue dot indicates that the pilot is commanding something which is
deemed less than ideal by the FEP system.
Inside the the dark gray background of the display is a lighter gray rectan-
gle bordered in yellow. This area represents the area of safe control authority.
Ensuring the aircraft commands remain within this boundary is one way the
pilot can help to avoid loss of control. Note that this means the green indica-
tor circle will never leave the confines of this envelope. This yellow boundary
corresponds to the FEP hard limits, and therefore the yellow boundaries found
on the previous set of displays. This general display scheme should similar to
ideas mentioned in the introductory section on ecological design which relied
on using a shape defined by system parameters to display constantly changing
information. As in the display designed for use in a driving vehicle, our display
14
uses emergent shape to instruct the pilot. A large envelope, whose borders meet
those of the display box means the pilot has a large amount of safe control au-
thority. A smaller, more restrictive box indicates that the pilot should refrain
from making any significant movements. This box can also be oblong in shape,
indicating that only movement in a single axis is considered safe. This fact
highlights the benefit of providing the FEP envelope information in this second
fashion. The display clearly indicates to the pilot where they can safely move
the control yoke.
It should be noted that this envelope will, in certain cases, form a straight
line, or constrict to a single point. In practice, this will occur after an extremely
aggressive wind event occurs, or if the pilot intentionally attempts to cause the
aircraft to lose control. In most of these cases the line or point will be somewhere
on the edge of the display indicating that the only safe control position is an
extreme input position. In the current state of the design this configuration
results in the yellow boundary being occluded by the green marker.
A similar panel is replicated below the yoke display which shows the status of
the rudder pedals. This is a single axis graph, with envelope boundaries marked
on the right and left extremes. The circular marker are replaced by vertical
bars which follow the same color schema, blue for pilot, green for FEP derived.
The same dynamics occur here, albeit in a single dimension. This single axis
variant of the display is also used on the throttle display, albeit with the blue
marker separated into two pieces, a white chevron on the side indicating current
throttle position, and a blue bar indicating current engine levels. In the course
of normal operation the engine status bar will lag slightly behind the pilot input
as the engines respond to the new power setting. The flaps, while ultimately
unused in experimental evaluation, also follow the design of separating markers
for designated setting and actual setting, as there is a noticeable lag before the
flaps reach the desired setting. Directly above the right hand FEP display is an
indicator light. This light’s text, color, and functionality change based off the
operational mode the system is currently in, as described blow.
The final FEP related display components are actually positioned directly
above the PFD elements. There are a series of four horizontal annunciator lights
which read: ‘Speed’, ‘AOA’ (Angle of Attack), ‘Pitch’, and ‘Roll’. By default,
these elements are grayed out with slightly darker gray text. However, when
an excursion occurs in one of these four channels, the indicator changes to a
red color with yellow text (stylistically identical to the FEP Off annunciator
described below). While we anticipate that participants will primarily attend
to one of the two major flight displays, these provide yet another warning signal
that the aircraft has moved beyond safe operational limits.
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4.4 Operational Modes
The display components can be used in two different operational modes: FEP
On and FEP Off. In both of these modes, the FEP system is running and
collecting information on the system state. However, the impact on the pilot’s
actions and the actions of the display components is slightly different.
Figure 4.4: The full display panel in the FEP On Mode.
4.4.1 FEP On
In the FEP On Mode, the automation system works as described previous and
actively modifies the pilot input commands. Any time the directed command
would result in an envelop excursion, the FEP system will apply the appro-
priate adjustment and send a the modified command to the aircraft. From an
operational perspective, this has the impact of reducing total control at certain
points. For example, directing a hard bank command will eventually cease to
effect the bank angle. The maximum safe angle of bank will be reached, and
continuing to input a turn command will have no effect. This is the mode of op-
eration the FEP system was originally designed to operate in, without a direct
display output.
When the plane is in safe flight, and pilot commands are within the safety
envelope, the FEP annunciator will be a yellow color and read “FEP Armed”.
This indicates a ‘standby’ state. If an envelope limit is reached, this indicator
will change to a green color and read “FEP Active”, as seen in figure 4.5. This
means the pilot command is not being directly fed to the aircraft, but that the
FEP is actively modifying aircraft state. This state change is also indicated by
the fact that the blue, pilot directed marker will be separated from the green
marker on the right hand display. On the standard (left hand) instrument
displays the active state means that a soft limit has been exceeded and as such
an indicator may have turned red. We note that while this is frequently the
case, it is possible the excursion was caused by a combination of factors that
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Figure 4.5: The FEP display in the On mode, during an envelope excursion. The
top indicator annunciator has turned green and the blue pilot control marker has
moved beyond the yellow safety envelope. In this situation, the green marker
indicates the yoke position that is currently being sent to the aircraft.
does not impact a left hand display item. It is important to note that these
two displays are not redundant. These cases are frequently related to airspeed
and the throttle indicator on the right hand side of the display will indicate
the boundaries accordingly. We note here that in the ‘FEP Active’ state, the
pilot command continues to influence the direction of the aircraft. The FEP
system will always choose the safe control position closest to the pilot directed
command. This level of control means that given an identical scenario, different
pilots will perform at different levels.
4.4.2 FEP Off
The FEP Off mode disables any automation control, but continues to run the
calculations necessary to drive the display components. No matter what the
state of the system, the pilot command is sent directly to the aircraft. Returning
to the roll example, in this mode, the maximum safe bank angle can be exceeded
and the plane can be rolled a full 180 degrees. Functionally, this mode is identical
to full manual control of the aircraft.
In addition to this major operational difference there are also several dis-
play differences. During normal, safe flight the FEP annunciator above the
right-hand display will be a grayed out color with the text ‘FEP Off’. When
a computed safely envelope is exceeded, the text remains the same, and the
annunciator turns red in color, as seen in figure 4.6. This color is meant to draw
attention to the fact that the aircraft is in a potential loss of control situation.
This contrasts with the previous mode, where the automation system provided
protection against loss of control.
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Figure 4.6: The FEP display in the Off mode, during an envelope excursion.
The top indicator annunciator has turned red and the blue pilot control marker
has moved beyond the yellow safety envelope. Here, the red halo surrounding
the blue marker indicates the current control being sent to the aircraft. The
task for the subject is now to bring the control yoke back within the envelope.
In the main FEP display window this will cause the blue marker, representing
pilot input, to leave the boundaries of the yellow envelope display. To highlight
this, the circle gains a red halo which draws pilot attention. Note that the
green marker, which continues to indicate the FEP computed best position will
remain in the envelope. Eliminating this halo (and the excursion) then becomes
a tracking task, returning the blue marker to the green marker in the envelope.
The fact that the pilot has full manual control of the aircraft introduces
several major changes to addressing a problem. First, if the pilot chooses to
follow FEP guidance there will be a delay between the computation of the best
position, and the pilot giving the command. This delay will presumably result
in a degree of lowered performance. Second, and perhaps more interesting is,
this display allows the pilot to choose to selectively ignore suggestions from the
automation. While we hypothesize that in most cases automation will provide
better control feedback, there remains the possibility that in certain circum-
stances the pilot may be able to selectively weight information gained from the
automation with domain knowledge or experience. This may allow them to pilot
the plane in a way that may result in a longer temporary excursion from a single
envelope, but ultimately decrease or eliminate the amount of time spent in a
multi-excursion state. Understanding when this type of scenario would occur is
part of the long term goals for the project.
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Chapter 5
Experimental Design
To evaluate our design, we ran a small pilot study at the Illinois Simulator
Laboratory in the flight simulator facility. This study allowed us to begin eval-
uation of our design as well as troubleshoot problems with our approach and
experimental design in preparation for future iteration. This section details the
technical setup of the simulator, the participant pool used for the study, as well
as the experimental design and data gathering techniques used.
5.1 Simulator Setup
The flight simulator laboratory houses a static FRASCA simulator. The sim-
ulator is based on a Frasca 142 cockpit surrounded by three projector screens
displaying the outside view (figure 5.1. In the cockpit, the standard display
panel has been replaced with a digital monitor which can be customized to
show any view or panel configuration. The physical controls are all the original
unmodified Frasca components. For the sake of the experiment, pilots began
and ended individual scenarios while in flight. That is, taxi, take-off, and land-
ing were not a part of the task. This reduces the number of controls the pilot
needs to attend to. Additionally, participants were instructed that the flap posi-
tion should not be changed for the duration of the scenario. Ultimately the only
controls used were the control yoke, the throttle levers, and the yaw pedals. The
panel display was implemented in Unity and utilize pieces of an existing flight
display library [8] modified to include our custom components. The outside
view projections are driven by a cluster of machines running XPlane 10. The
physics model of the aircraft was provided by NASA [21] and run in Matlab.
The FEP system was also implemented in Matlab.
During the flight sessions all room light was turned off to decrease distrac-
tion. The study leader remained in the co-pilot’s seat for the duration of the
flights.
In addition to the standard flight setup an eye tracking system was used
to gather additional data. The eye tracking system is a commercial solution.
The system relies on four infrared camera supplemented by two infrared light
sources. The cameras are positioned around the perimeter of the interface panel.
The light sources cause small reflections of the surface of the eye which are
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Figure 5.1: A view of the flight simulator at the Illinois Simulator Laboratory
flying over Chicago. Note that this view differs from the experimental setup,
during which participants flew in a thick cloud cover.
tracked by the camera. The movement of these reflections can be used to gauge
the position of the eye overall, and therefore the direction it’s pointing. The
provided software allows for the creation of a gridded panel which corresponds
to the interface the pilot is using. Using this panel, the software records the
frequency and duration of participant gaze in each of the numbered segments.
5.2 Conditions
For evaluation of our display panels, we used three conditions that were com-
pleted by all of our participants. We counterbalanced the order of these con-
ditions between participants. That is, each of the possible orderings of the
three conditions were evenly distributed among participants to alleviate poten-
tial learning effects. We think of these conditions as a gradual ’stepping up’ of
aid given to the human operator both in terms of information provided and con-
trol authority assumed by the automation system. To this end, we hypothesized
that final condition would lead to the highest level of pilot performance.
It should be noted that given the configuration options discussed, the state
space for this setup is significantly large. Just as a quick recap, the FEP system
can be either in the ’on’ or ’off’ mode. Additionally the display components
have four viable configurations: the basic panel with no additions, the left hand
standard display with augmentation sans FEP display, the FEP display alone, or
all of the display components including augmentation. It would also be possible
to run certain display configurations without telling the pilot before hand which
of the FEP modes is active. We believe the three conditions chosen are an
representative sample of this space, and provide insight into future experimental
setup.
The first condition is a control in which pilots are placed in a aircraft with
no additional information or automation aid. During the entirety of the flight
scenarios, pilots are in full manual control of the aircraft and are given only
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the standard flight information. Augmentation is off and right hand display
is removed entirely. This condition is meant to emulate the standard mode of
operation pilots are familiar with and evaluate base level performance.
The second condition built on top of the standard set of display with the
addition of both augmented limit displays and our novel FEP display, but with
the FEP in the ’off’ state. In this condition, the pilot remained in full manual
control of the aircraft with the automation system, monitoring pilot input but
never intervening in aircraft control. In this way, the control configuration of
the aircraft was identical to the configuration found in the control condition.
The only difference was the additional display information. Our belief is that,
by having a more comprehensive understanding of system state, the pilot would
be better able to apply expert knowledge to a given wind event. Note that
the information being provided comes directly from the automation system and
represents the automation derived limits. While the standard display provides
only information regarding the current value for certain flight parameters of
the aircraft, the additional display components provide information about the
potential range of these values. As discussed previously, these envelopes provide
a concrete visualization of the safe range of control authority. Pilots are better
able to recognize the boundaries of safe operation, and recognize which actions
of theirs bring the aircraft closer to those boundaries.
The third and final condition is identical to the second in terms of displayed
information, but engages the full flight envelope protection system (FEP ’On’
mode). This means that when the aircraft moves beyond safe flight envelopes
the control system will modify pilot input to bring the aircraft back inside these
envelopes. This overriding of control authority only occurs when the aircraft
is moved beyond the safety envelopes. The automation directed control will
always be the point closest to that directed by the pilot. That is, if the pilot
directs a hard bank left which exceeds the envelop limits, the FEP will modify
the command to be the left bank which is closest to pilot command. Aside from
these excursions, the pilot remains in full control. This third condition involves
the most modification from the base control condition.
5.3 Training and Scenarios
To evaluate pilot performance, a set of flight scenarios were developed that were
used in each condition. These scenarios were developed to emulate a microburst
turbulence event, typified by a brief, but very strong wind gust. Each of these
events lasts around two minutes. In each scenario, the pilot takes control of the
aircraft in the air. The aircraft always begins at 10,000 feet, 180 knots, and
090 degrees heading. These are the variables the pilot is instructed to maintain
or correct to during the entirety of the scenario. After a brief period of time
(10 to 20 seconds) a severe wind event occurs that lasts from 30 to 90 seconds.
The events are designed to cause excursion from safety envelopes, and result in
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a temporary loss of control. During and after the wind event, the pilots were
instructed to regain the starting flight parameters. The scenarios complete two
minutes after the pilot takes control of the aircraft.
Pilots are evaluated on their ability to maintain both control of the aircraft
as well as the provided flight parameters. Note that it is not possible to simply
observe excursions of the safety envelopes. While flying the scenarios, the pilot
can lower the priority of maintaining flight parameters and ’go with the flow’.
While in some cases this may result in a crash, in many of our scenarios, slight
pilot input can avert complete disaster, but results in extremely lowered altitude
and heading far off from its original value. In these cases, the number of enve-
lope excursions may be low, but we would still consider the pilot performance
significantly sub-par. Functionally, this results in the pilot acting as though the
aircraft is a glider and simply allowing the wind to take it where it will.
Each of our participants underwent the same set of training and preparation
for each experimental run. Subjects came to four separate sessions, each lasting
approximately an hour. The first of these was an training sessions which served
to familiarize subjects with the simulator. During this hour subjects were given
the control condition interface and FEP activation state (that is, FEP Off).
A description of the display panel (included in appendix A.) was read prior to
flight. They were given time before the session to view a flight plan that included
climbing and falling, periods of static flight, and both level and banking turns.
Subjects were then led through this pattern with the experiment leader guiding
them with a description of each maneuver before execution. Performance was
not a concern during this session, and none of the data gathered was used during
analysis. Completing the pattern took approximately twenty-five minutes. After
this, subjects were given a five minutes period to fly freely and complete any
maneuvers they felt would give them a better understanding of the aircraft
dynamics. During both of these periods, there were no disturbances.
Each of the three subsequent sessions followed the same schedule and differed
only in terms of the configuration of the simulator. Upon arrival, participants
were calibrated into the eye tracking system. After this, the verbal explanation
for the control system used was read out loud. (Each of these scripts can be
found in appendix B.) Then, to familiarize themselves with the operation mode
in action and re-familiarize with aircraft dynamics, subjects were given five
minutes to fly freely with no wind events.
Finally, the final portion of these sessions is the evaluation period. Is is
only during this time that subjects are being recorded and evaluated for perfor-
mance. Each wind scenario took approximately two minutes to complete. After
each scenario completed, participants were prompted to complete the subjective
response booklet which is described below. During this time the experimenter
reset the simulator for the next scenario run. No additional feedback or in-
struction was given between scenarios, the only communication was to ensure
consistent number of feedback. The running of ten scenarios takes approxi-
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mately thirty minutes, after which the participants completed the post-session
questionnaire.
5.4 Data Tracking
We track a variety of data points throughout the study. These measures gauge
the overall performance of pilots and track potential improvements.
Simulator Data The largest source of data collection is the information
recorded by the flight simulator software. This information is saved by the
simulator at a rate of 60Hz. Each saved frame is a MATLAB data object con-
taining all of the state information of the aircraft at the given point in time.
This information includes flight parameters such as airspeed, altitude, heading,
as well as information about pilot control position. This also includes all of the
information used internally by the FEP system and the number of envelopes
and the length and magnitude of excursions. This information forms the bulk
of what is presented in this thesis, as it is the most reliable and objective.
As mentioned above, our simulator setup is outfitted with an eye tracking
system. This system records both eye directions and determines the point of
interest. The information is reported as x-y coordinates. This information is
recorded separately from the simulator data. Both data files record timestamps
from initialization, which allows synchronization after the fact.
Subjective Responses As an additional measure we collected subjective as-
sessments using a modified version of the NASA Task Load Index (TLX) work-
load assessment tool. This scoring tool is specifically designed for use with
“operator(s) working with various human-machine systems” [17]. Scales pro-
vided in the standard TLX provide 21 points along a scale running from low
to high (or failure to perfect). We replicated the TLX provided on the official
distribution, which is in turn modeled off the TLX manual published but the
Human Performance Research Group at NASA Ames Research Center. Each
of the experimental conditions utilized some unique questions specific to that
configuration. The full set of questions can be found in appendix A.
Additionally, we included a set of other questions specifically targeting par-
ticipants’ opinions of the added interface items, and their rating of their perfor-
mance. These questions varied slightly between experimental conditions. Like
the TLX ratings, these questions were answered immediately after each sce-
nario. There was also a ‘wrap-up’ question set completed after all ten scenarios.
These questions were a combination of numerical ratings, yes/no questions, and
written response. All of these questions for each of the three sessions are also
presented in appendix A.
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Chapter 6
Results
6.1 Participants
In the preliminary study presented in this thesis, we ran the described exper-
imental setup with six participants. This small sample size, while insufficient
for drawing strong conclusions based on the data, allows us to evaluated our
methodology for soundness, and ensure that our data collection and scenarios
were well designed.
These participants were all students pulled from the Parkland and Univer-
sity of Illinois Flight schools. All participants were either first or second year
students who had completed basic flight training. All four of the experimental
sessions (training and three conditions) were completed within two weeks of a
participant beginning the study.
6.2 Flight Data
The recorded flight data presented an incredibly large set of information, even
among the six participants. Between these six participants, there were a total of
180 recorded scenario runs, each lasting approximately 2 minutes a piece. Pre-
sented in this thesis is an initial look at some of the basic information gathered,
as well as general insights that can inform future research.
The first set of data provided plots overall task performance measured by the
LoC envelope violations. These are calculated as an integral over the duration
of the disturbance of the exceedance of protected flight parameter. These terms
are normalized to account for both upper and lower limit violations and then
normalized with respect to the length of the given scenario. This results in a
unitless value. In all of the plots presented, a lower value indicates better per-
formance. Also note that on several charts, bars extend beyond the cutoff point
of the y-axis. In these cases, one or more ‘catastrophic’ failures occurred, result-
ing in extremely dramatic and long envelope excursions. In order to preserve
difference between lower valued bars, these values are cropped.
Figure 6.1 shows the average envelope exceedances for each of the ten sce-
narios averaged among the participants. The final ‘overall’ chart presents the
summed total of the three envelope channels. The first of note is the incredibly
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Figure 6.1: Envelope exceedances averaged across participants for all scenarios
by condition.
high variance among all the data in the control condition. This observation is
echoed throughout the data, as well as in the questionnaire responses. Pilot skill
levels seemed to vary greatly, which is reflected in both actual performance, and
perceived difficult.
We note also that in the ‘Overall’ graph, both the average and the variance
of the ‘FEP - Standard’ (FEP On) condition is lower. This is not altogether
surprising, as in these cases, FEP control was able to account for disturbances
much faster than an unaided pilot. Unfortunately in the ‘FEP - Alternative’
(FEP Off) scenario, large variance makes it difficult to make strong claims about
the effectiveness of the interface, in particular from this graph alone. However,
in over half scenarios (1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9) there appears to be an overall downward
(improving) trend between conditions. Ideally, we would like to see this trend
in all of the conditions, and in a statistically significant way.
To further investigate this trend, it may be helpful to compare ‘per-scenario
graphs’ for two of the scenarios. In figure 6.2, we can examine these same metrics
for scenario 1, but separated by participant. Looking at the overall plot we can
see the same trend present in a subset of participants. Significant failures in
the control condition were replaced by stronger performances in experimental
conditions in all but one of the cases. Further analysis is necessary to understand
the impact each of the three envelopes has on the overall performance.
We can compare this plot with the same data shown in figure 6.3 for scenario
7, which exhibited the same downward trend in our averages plot. Here however,
we notice that in the overall case, the improvement from the control is seen
only in half of the participants and in less amounts. It appears the failures
experienced by participant 5 ‘drown out’ the lack of an improving trend in the
25
Figure 6.2: Envelope exceedances for scenario 1 separated by participant.
Figure 6.3: Envelope exceedances for scenario 7 separated by participant.
other cases. Looking at the directional envelope in this plot, the impact of a
single poor trail becomes apparent. The significant differences in values here
underly the difficulty of comparing performance.
Finally, we can look specifically at the results of an individual participant
to understand on a very specific level how their performance changed from con-
dition to condition. While this does not provide any statistical understanding,
it can be interesting nevertheless to examine the data at this level of detail.
Figure 6.4a and 6.4b show the performance of participant five during scenario
1 during the control condition and the FEP Off condition. In this chart, red
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(a) Control Condition
(b) FEP Off Condition
Figure 6.4: A comparison of angle of sideslip (β) and angle of bank (Φ) for
participant 5 on condition 1.
lines represent the hard and soft limits (solid and dashed respectively). Pilot
input is presented with a blue line. The number of envelope excursions is noted
by vertical bands from 1-3 as gray, yellow, and orange. Note that for these two
conditions both the wind event and the control configuration are identical. In
both cases the pilot is in full manual control of the aircraft. The only differ-
ence is the addition of the FEP display components. The significant difference
in performance comes in the latter half of the scenario, when the pilot is at-
tempting to correct back to initial heading. In the control, the pilot continues
to fully depress the rudder pedals (β at 10) until the scenario times out. This
position of the rudder is considered to be outside one of the defined safely. In
the FEP Off condition, this does not occur, and the pilot returns to safe flight
immediately after the wind event. It is tempting to assume that this is due to
the display components. However, this type of conclusion would be impossible
without additional corroboration through the eye-tracking data. Further inves-
tigation also indicates that in the FEP Off condition, the heading of the aircraft
was not as affected, reducing the need for over-correction. This perhaps lessens
the potential impact the FEP display had in this particular case.
Significant work is necessary to fully understand and analyze this data. The
complexities of flight dynamics paired with the difficulty of gauging human
attention and performance make this a difficult problem. The current dataset
provides a clear starting point for this analysis, and already indicates several
important ways in which the experimental setup can be improved.
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6.3 Written Responses
Among the written responses prompted during the two experimental conditions
are several interesting insights or criticisms of the system. Unfortunately, many
of the participants did not write responses for some of the questions, as they were
conditional upon answer (e.g.: “if yes please explain”). Additional answers were
short, or non-descriptive. Of the participants who responded several expressed
interesting insight.
On the subject of layout design, one participant responded, “It is REALLY
EASY [sic] to ignore the rudder input under the novel display. There are times
where the annunciator was on but I did not see the blue dot out of the yellow
box”. This same participant also indicated that there was excess information,
and in particular found the yellow bars surrounding the attitude indicator on
the PFD unnecessary. Another participant critiqued the entire FEP display, an-
swering the prompt ,“What do you think should be removed?” with, “The new
one right of the AI [attitude indicator] with the green blue white [sic] circles”.
While these are only the opinions of two participants after a single condition,
they highlight an important issue. An important part of our task is designing an
interface which presents not simply all of the information, but information that
will help build a veridical model of the aircraft and increase overall situational
awareness. If extraneous information is distracting and ignored, or conversely,
important information is neglected, the pilot will be less able to understand
system state.
There were not simply critical statements, during the final condition (FEP
On), one participant suggested, “I almost want the control input limit display
(the envelope box with blue/green dots) in front of me on the PFD, with the at-
titude limits less prominent. Pilot needs feedback on input, not attitude, during
recovery from these extreme flight excursions”. The subject demonstrates here
a fundamental understanding of the distinction between the two flight displays.
They recognize that in certain cases they prefer to conceive of the problem of
recovery in terms of input limitations rather than flight parameter limitations.
A final interesting statement by a subject was that the display caused con-
fusion due to the fact that, “sometimes I think I got caught up looking at the
extra info and didn’t watch airspeed enough”. This seems to indicate (at least
in some part) that the new display components were considered too novel and
caused distraction during flight. This potential problem could be mitigated in
future studies by increased training time with each display configuration. Pilots
who have more experience with the display may be able to more accurately
judge when it is appropriate to engage with the display.
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6.4 Eye Tracking
Unfortunately, the eye tracking system’s dependence on clear sight-lines (both
light to eye and eye to camera) coupled with the fact that participants are al-
lowed to freely move their heads results in non-ideal conditions which lower the
tracking accuracy as considerably. Even among our smaller test set, we found
difficulties with pilots: wearing eye-glasses, readjusting their body position out-
side the ideal camera field, wearing longer hair which occludes the eyes, moving
their hands across the field of view, tilting their heads in a way that obfus-
cates the eyes. When one of these things occurs, accuracy (or even tracking
altogether) can drop considerably. Even in an ideal case, the system frequently
fluctuates in accuracy. This makes the use of smaller eye tracking zones (such
as those used for the g-load or side-slip displays) even more difficult. Achieving
ideal accuracy for these regions is difficult even during the calibration phase,
with degradation increasing as the trial continues. For these reasons, the data
we present in this thesis is not pulled from the participant run, but rather comes
from a controlled internal test subject, where we were better able to ensure the
data quality was high. This data gives an indication of how our data may be
processed and how it could be used in the future.
Figure 6.5: Processed eye data displayed over time, divided into major interface
components.
In figure 6.5 we see the processed eye data. Time is indicated along the x-
axis with the major divisions of interface panel shown along y-axis. Apart from
the ‘Flag’ position (the annunciators above the PFD), the display is divided
horizontally. The blue marks indicated an eye position at a given time step.
Horizontal yellow bars are provided simply for convenience, but do not represent
any real difference.
Several observations are worth noting. First, it appears as if the pilot largely
does not attend to the FEP or throttle displays. However, these moments were
recorded, it just happens that the subject never made direct eye contact with
the display surface. The frequent jumps above the 0.25 line dividing the PFD
are located just before the boundary between PDF and FEP display (near the
rate of change indicator). In these cases the pilot was glancing from the corner
of the eye, and was able to adequately read the information. Additionally, in
several of these controlled (non-experimental) test runs, eye data was incorrectly
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tracked, with large periods of time lacking data all together.
One of the most difficult things about potentially using the gathered data
in its current state is the fact that comparing accurate data with inaccurate
data is difficult. This is true when it comes to the display augmentations that
were added to the right hand display. While we were fairly confident that it
would not be possible to track the use of the yellow bars on the existing display
(as they are both moving and very small), we included tracking regions for the
three additional displays interspersed among the original display. It would have
been a compelling result if we could observe the frequency with which the pilots
attended to these specific components compared to the new display on the right
hand side. Significant differences in usage of these two could provide insight
into pilot preference for the location of automation information.
Being able to distinguish between these components would also allow us to
make some conclusions about the overall utilization of our new components.
Perhaps the pilot is attending only to the original display even in the experi-
mental conditions, and simply ignoring the new information we are providing. If
this is the case, we would expect to see little, if any, activation of the new panels.
(Unfortunately, to make this conclusion with any certainty, we would need to
observe use of the envelope displays integrated with core components such as
pitch and roll.) In the data above, we primarily attempted distinguish between
broad classes of interface. Apart from the lack of accuracy in the gathered data,
the other shortfall of this approach is that it fails to clearly partition prolonged
gaze as either “original component” or “new component”. The EPR, flap, and
spoiler displays all are positioned on the right hand side, and the yellow aug-
mentation and components such as slide slip are all on the left. While we may
notice an increase in the usage of the right hand panels during experimental
conditions, strong conclusions cannot be drawn from this data, but may serve
as anecdotal observations during specific scenario runs.
30
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future
Work
The work presented in this thesis provides only the framework for a continued
research effort. We hope the tools developed for this project and the basic
methodology outlined in this thesis will serve as a guideline for further develop-
ment. This section outlines some of these goals and refinements. First, a larger
subject pool would allow for more robust conclusions. As the data stands, we are
unable to make any firm conclusions, but it provides at least an indication that
our process is viable. In the course of bringing this pilot study to completion,
several errors were found in our experimental setup. As mentioned above, we
inadvertently did not record information regarding the ideal FEP state during
the control condition due to the complete inactivation of the FEP subsystem.
Including this information in further studies could provide further metrics for
performance and perhaps give an indication of the deviation between the pilot’s
na¨ıve attempt and the FEP computed control. If this error had been noticed at
the outset of pilot testing, it would have been a straightforward change.
Additionally, despite time-consuming efforts to ensure the equal difficulty of
the wind scenarios, we consistently found that pilots rated the difficulty as un-
equal. As mentioned earlier, this seems to be due to the fact that many of our
participants failed maintain desired flight goals (altitude, heading, airspeed).
Releasing these parameters allowed them to ‘go with the flow’, which resulted
in lowered perceptions of difficulty. While measuring the length and magnitude
of the deviation from these goals and including this in the overall scoring of a
scenario would be a start at resolving these issues, additional scenario develop-
ment may be necessary. It would also be possible to increase a pilot’s recognition
of the importance of the task at hand. In this run of the experiment, subjects
were told once at the beginning of each session what the goals were. It would be
possible to reinforce this goal between every scenario and perhaps even includ-
ing a warning light or noise when status is beyond a certain threshold. In terms
of scenario development it seems that without developing a completely separate
user study, evaluation of difficulty is largely subjective. Although it may be
possible to create a ‘baseline’ by flying the aircraft without a pilot, in reality,
expert opinion seems necessary to assess the potential value of a scenario.
This relates to another difficulty in analyzing our data, mainly the way in
which small differences in initial action dramatically effect final outcome. In
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our initial exploration of the data, it is tempting to look at the deviation from
the stated flight path as poor overall performance. However, in several cases,
it seems as if a single ‘mis-response’ by the pilot could severely compound the
effects of the wind event, resulting in a dramatically decreased score. This
could occur even if a similar strategy was employed beyond this initial mistake.
Better understanding and accounting for these dramatic deviations will help in
comparing runs of the same scenario.
Future work may also be more stringent on the selection of participants.
One potential explanation of the large variance among subjects’ performances
would be differences in their skills at piloting an aircraft. Given a larger par-
ticipant pool, it would be possible to vet participants by running through an
initial evaluation session. This would allow lower performing individuals to be
preemptively dropped from the trial runs.
Less critical to the overall success of the project, if a similar testing schedule
was followed to the one outlined in this thesis, it would be fairly straightforward
to increase the number of scenarios run without dramatically increasing the
amount of time needed. The calibration of the eye-tracking software took almost
half of the allotted time with the ten scenarios taking only 30 minutes in most
cases. If sessions lengths were expanded to 90 minutes, and participants were
given a short 5 minute break between 10 scenario blocks, it would be possible
to double the number of data points gathered, while only increasing the cost by
50%.
Other considerations for future work involve different configurations of the
interface provided to the pilot. The three conditions used in this study were
chosen to represent a gradual ‘stepping up’ of assistance to the pilot. However,
there are a variety of other configurations that could be applied. In particular,
it may be interesting to more accurately determine which of the two interface
additions the pilot is utilizing. While eye-tracking is somewhat helpful in this
goal, it is not definitive and adding more experimental conditions would allow
this to be more fully vetted. For example, a pilot could run with the right hand
display components disabled, while retaining use of the yellow envelope markers
on the standard display units, or vice versa. These configurations could be
done both with the FEP on or off. Notice, that this gives four total conditions,
without including a control. It should be fairly evident that given the number of
possible configurations available, the experimental space could quickly balloon,
making analysis intractable.
A separate question raised by this system is the impact it would have on
resolving problems that arise after long term use. In all of the scenarios tested,
pilots were aware that they were beginning a task during which they would
encounter a turbulence event and that they would be required to take certain
actions to ensure the plane did not lose control. This is a very different situation
than determining the ability of an interface to improve a pilot’s performance
when they are caught suddenly unaware. We rely on the intuitive assertion that
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increasing pilot awareness of automation system state will result in this desired
performance gain, but without further testing it is difficult to say this with any
certainty.
One possible way to address this concern is obviously to increase the length
of the trial. However, in terms of subject payment this possibility could prove
cost inhibitive. A less time consuming solution could be to increase cockpit
distraction in an attempt to manufacture a loss of attention situation. This
could be achieved by adding a more complex flight directive to the scenarios, or
adding a secondary task.
Outside of the domain of aircraft control, there may be further research
opportunities in applying this interface design language and strategy to other
problem which involve the use of automation. The general concept of using
continuously updating envelopes to describe automation action seems helpful,
and is more descriptive than simply a warning light. In the near term, our
team is exploring the possibility of using a similar approach in the field of
anesthesiology. While many of the specifics are significantly different than flying,
the concept of keeping a state variable within high and low safety boundaries
while operating with the assistance of an automation system are extremely
similar. Exploring this domain, and applying these ideas would not only provide
additional results, but move this project from an engineering solution of a single
problem, to a more generally applicable principle-based multi-use solution.
While we are unable to draw any strong conclusions from the data gathered,
preliminary results, in particular when examining more proficient pilot scenarios
seem to indicate that pieces of our novel display components may help pilots in
better understanding system state. The work presented in this thesis was geared
not towards comprehensive study of the interface, but as a pilot study to debug
problems and serve as a proof of concept. To this end, the work was a great
success, an initial group of data has been taken, and basic analysis complete.
While there is certainly room for improvement, the core of this work should
apply to future iterations of the project.
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Appendix A
TLX Content
During each of the three conditions, subjects were given booklets containing
the described TLX rubrics as well as an additional battery of questions. In
each condition, The first two pages included were duplicated ten times and
completed after each of the scenario runs. The final page included is the ‘post’
questionnaire, which was completed after the final scenario.
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A.1 Control Condition
1
Do you feel like you lost control of the aircraft at any time?
☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, were you able to regain control?
☐ Yes     ☐ No     ☐ N/A
How well do you think you did in keeping the aircraft in a safe flight 
condition?
☐ 1 - Couldn’t keep the aircraft in a safe flight condition.
☐ 2 - Had a hard time keeping aircraft in a safe flight condition.
☐ 3 - Kept the aircraft in a safe flight condition most of the time.
☐ 4 - The aircraft was always kept in a safe flight condition.
Please rate the overall difficulty of this trial.
☐ 1 - The trial was impossible.
☐ 2 - Some major difficulties were experienced.
☐ 3 - Some minor difficulty was experienced.
☐ 4 - No difficulties were experienced during the trial.
Sc# ___
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How mentally demanding was the task?
How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task?
How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to 
do?
How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of 
performance?
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you?
Very Low Very High
Very Low Very High
Perfect Failure
Very Low Very High
Very Low Very High
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Post
The 10 scenarios had a similar level of difficulty.
☐ 1 - Disagree.
☐ 2 - Somewhat disagree.
☐ 3 - Somewhat agree.
☐ 4 - Agree.
Is this aircraft easier or more difficult to fly than what you are currently 
used to flying? (Please circle one.)
(Easier)   3  –  2  –  1  –  0  –  1  –  2  –  3   (More Difficult)
37
A.2 Experimental Condition #1
1
Do you feel like you lost control of the aircraft at any time?
☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, were you able to regain control?
☐ Yes     ☐ No     ☐ N/A
How well do you think you did in keeping the aircraft in a safe flight 
condition?
☐ 1 - Couldn’t keep the aircraft in a safe flight condition.
☐ 2 - Had a hard time keeping aircraft in a safe flight condition.
☐ 3 - Kept the aircraft in a safe flight condition most of the time.
☐ 4 - The aircraft was always kept in a safe flight condition.
Was the interface helpful to maintain the aircraft within safe envelopes?
☐ 1 - No help at all.
☐ 2 - Slightly helpful.
☐ 3 - Fairly helpful.
☐ 4 - Very helpful.
Please rate the overall difficulty of this trial.
☐ 1 - The trial was impossible.
☐ 2 - Some major difficulties were experienced.
☐ 3 - Some minor difficulty was experienced.
☐ 4 - No difficulties were experienced during the trial. 
Sc# ___
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How mentally demanding was the task?
How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task?
How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to 
do?
How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of 
performance?
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you?
Very Low Very High
Very Low Very High
Perfect Failure
Very Low Very High
Very Low Very High
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Post
The 10 scenarios had a similar level of difficulty.
☐ 1 - Disagree.
☐ 2 - Somewhat disagree.
☐ 3 - Somewhat agree.
☐ 4 - Agree.
Is this aircraft easier or more difficult to fly than what you are currently 
used to flying? (Please circle one.)
(Easier)   3  –  2  –  1  –  0  –  1  –  2  –  3   (More Difficult)
Did you get confused by any of the information displayed? 
☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, can you briefly describe the source of your confusion?
Is there any additional information that you would like to see 
represented in the interface? ☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, can you briefly describe the additional information you think 
would be helpful?
Do you think there is too much information in the current design of the 
interface? ☐ Yes     ☐ No
If  yes, what do you think should be removed?
Do you have any other suggestions regarding the layout or the design 
of the interface?
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A.3 Experimental Condition #2
1
Do you feel like you lost control of the aircraft at any time?
☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, were you able to regain control?
☐ Yes     ☐ No     ☐ N/A
 Did the protection system restrict your ability to control the aircraft in any way 
that was undesirable? ☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, please describe the perceived control restriction.
How well do you think you did in keeping the aircraft in a safe flight condition?
☐ 1 - Couldn’t keep the aircraft in a safe flight condition.
☐ 2 - Had a hard time keeping aircraft in a safe flight condition.
☐ 3 - Kept the aircraft in a safe flight condition most of the time.
☐ 4 - The aircraft was always kept in a safe flight condition.
Was the interface helpful to maintain the aircraft within safe envelopes?
☐ 1 - No help at all.
☐ 2 - Slightly helpful.
☐ 3 - Fairly helpful.
☐ 4 - Very helpful.
Please rate the overall difficulty of this trial.
☐ 1 - The trial was impossible.
☐ 2 - Some major difficulties were experienced.
☐ 3 - Some minor difficulty was experienced.
☐4 - No difficulties were experienced during the trial. 
Sc# ___
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How mentally demanding was the task?
How hurried or rushed was the pace of the task?
How successful were you in accomplishing what you were asked to 
do?
How hard did you have to work to accomplish your level of 
performance?
How insecure, discouraged, irritated, stressed, and annoyed were you?
Very Low Very High
Very Low Very High
Perfect Failure
Very Low Very High
Very Low Very High
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Post
The 10 scenarios had a similar level of difficulty.
☐ 1 - Disagree.
☐ 2 - Somewhat disagree.
☐ 3 - Somewhat agree.
☐ 4 - Agree.
Is this aircraft easier or more difficult to fly than what you are currently used to 
flying? (Please circle one.)
(Easier)   3  –  2  –  1  –  0  –  1  –  2  –  3   (More Difficult)
Did you notice any adverse pilot-automation interactions? 
☐ Yes     ☐ No 
If yes, please describe the adverse interaction(s).
Did you get confused by any of the information displayed? 
☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, can you briefly describe the source of your confusion?
Is there any additional information that you would like to see represented in 
the interface? ☐ Yes     ☐ No
If yes, can you briefly describe the additional information you think would be 
helpful?
Do you think there is too much information in the current design of the 
interface? ☐ Yes     ☐ No
If  yes, what do you think should be removed?
Do you have any other suggestions regarding the layout or the design of the 
interface?
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Appendix B
Pilot Instructions
Before running any of the experimental conditions, the pilots were given a set of
verbal instructions regarding the usage of the instrument panel. These scripts
are replicated in their entirety below.
B.1 Control Condition
This instrument panel provides all of the standard information a pilot needs to
control the aircraft.
In the center is a conventional attitude indicator with miniature airplane
that indicates the pitch attitude of the aircraft. Labeled pitch bars show 10
degree increments while unlabeled bars indicate 5 and 2.5 degrees. At the top
of the display is a standard angle of bank arc with tick marks every ten degrees
to 30 and then at 45 and 60 degrees.
To the far left of the attitude indicator is a tape airspeed indicator. Your
current airspeed is shown in the marker box. The tape scrolls down as you
increase airspeed, and vice versa.
To the far right of the attitude indicator is the vertical speed tape. Vertical
speed is indicated by a white tape that extends from zero in either the up
direction for positive rate of climb or the down position for negative rate or a
descent. Note that the scale is not linear beyond 2- thousand feet per minute.
Up to 2-thousand, the tick marks are in 500 feet per minute increments. Beyond
2-thousand feet, they are in 2-thousand foot increments.
Just inside of the VSI is the altimeter tape. Current altitude is shown in
the marker box and will show every 20 feet of altitude change. The tape scrolls
down as you increase altitude, and vice versa.
Below the attitude indicator is the heading indicator. Current heading is
indicated in the marker box at the top of the display. Other than representing
on 110 degrees of the compass rose, the display is conventional in its markings.
To the right of the vertical speed tape is the power display, labeled in EPR.
Since this aircraft is a twin-engine, there is a right and left EPR value that rep-
resents the power output for each engine respectively. The moving bar indicates
power applied relative to total available while a digital readout below each bar
indicates exact power for that engine.
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To the right of the power display is a flap indicator and spoiler indicator.
Flaps will not be needed during the experiment, but the spoiler may be deployed
in any amount during flight to act as a speed brake in order to slow down.
B.2 Experimental Condition #1
Experimental Condition 1 instrument panel verbal instructions: This instru-
ment panel provides all of the standard information a pilot needs to control the
aircraft. Added to some instrumentation are yellow bars that advise the pilot
of soft and hard maneuvering limits. Soft limits are shown to warn the pilot
that the aircraft is close to the recommended maximum value (the hard limit).
Maneuvering beyond a hard limit can lead to loss of control, structural damage,
or both. In addition, three additional displays provide information you may not
have seen before and are described later.
In the center is a conventional attitude indicator with miniature airplane
that indicates the pitch attitude of the aircraft. Labeled pitch bars show 10
degree increments while unlabeled bars indicate 5 and 2.5 degrees. Soft limits
are indicated by yellow bar that is perpendicular to the attitude tape scale while
hard limits are indicated by a yellow bar parallel to the scale. At the top of
the display is a standard angle of bank arc with tick marks every ten degrees
to 30 and then at 45 and 60 degrees. Soft limits are indicated by a yellow bar
perpendicular to the angle of bank scale while hard limits are indicated by a
yellow bar parallel to the scale. The limit bars are dynamic in that they may
change in response to other aircraft flight variables.
To the far left of the attitude indicator is a tape airspeed indicator. Your
current airspeed is shown in the marker box. The tape scrolls down as you
increase airspeed, and vice versa. A yellow bar indicates reaching the range for
maximum airspeed. A red “candy-cane” bar indicates minimum speed range.
In between the airspeed and attitude indicator is a new display. This will
show you the angle of attack during flight. A white bar will always extend from
zero, with the current value indicated by the end of the white bar with the white
chevron. The tape range stays constant during flight. Angle of attack is the
angle between the average cord line of the wing and the relative wind, or flight
path. Since it’s directly related to lift, it provides a more direct indication of the
sufficiency of the lift currently produced. Although the range of the scale goes
to very high values, realize that the critical angle of attack is closer to 14 degrees
for this aircraft model. It is however possible to maneuver a swept wing jet with
engines mounted below the wing well beyond the critical angle and not realize
it. This is why the display can come in handy. This display is augmented with
yellow bars to indicate the flight envelope protection limits for angle of attack
as determined by the flight control computers. These bars can move, indicating
a change in the safe limits of the flight envelope. The yellow bar parallel to
the tape scale is the “soft” limit. In other words, if the actual angle of attack
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reaches this value, you are close to stalling. The yellow bar perpendicular to the
tape scale is the hard limit. You should not attempt to exceed the hard limit as
the aircraft will stall. You should always try to maneuver your aircraft so that
current indications do not go beyond a yellow perpendicular bar.
To the far right of the attitude indicator is the vertical speed tape. Vertical
speed is indicated by a white tape that extends from zero in either the up
direction for positive rate of climb or the down position for negative rate or a
descent. Note that the scale is not linear beyond 2-thousand feet per minute.
Up to 2-thousand, the tick marks are in 500 feet per minute increments. Beyond
2-thousand feet, they are in 2-thousand foot increments.
Just inside of the VSI is the altimeter tape. Current altitude is shown in
the marker box and will show every 20 feet of altitude change. The tape scrolls
down as you increase altitude, and vice versa.
In between the altimeter and the attitude indicator is a new display. This
display shows g-loading in the z-axis. That’s the conventional g-loading you
think about when, for example, pulling back on the control column. Remem-
ber that as the g-load increases, the weight the aircraft must counter with lift
increase, and thus the airspeed at which the aircraft will stall also increases.
A white bar will always extend from, 1, the unaccelerated g-load factor, to
the current g-load as indicated by the white chevron. This tape range stays
constant during flight. A yellow bar parallel to the tape scale indicates soft
limits for load-factor while a yellow bar perpendicular to the scale represents
the hard limits. These limits are dynamic in that if other flight variables are
exceeded or close to being exceeding, the maximum recommended load-factor
will be reduced as indicated by the yellow bars.
Directly below the attitude indicator is a new display. This display indicates
the side slip of the aircraft in degrees right or left of the longitudinal center-
line. One way to think of what this display tells you is who much side-load
is being applied to structures like the vertical tail surface. In addition, in-
creases in side slip reduces the streamlined airflow over the wings and partially
blocks the airflow on one wing. If sideslip is occurring, a white bar will extend
from zero indicating the direction of sideslip. Current sideslip is indicated by a
white chevron. Sideslip can be reduced by applying rudder in the direction that
sideslip is indicated; this action is similar to “stepping on the ball” in order to
maintain coordination. A yellow vertical bar indicates limits for sideslip. These
limits are dynamic and change as other flight variables change. For example,
as airspeed increase and approaches maximum values, recommended maximum
sideslip decreases in order to preserve structural integrity.
Below the side slip indicator is the heading indicator. Current heading is
indicated in the marker box at the top of the display. Other than representing
on 110 degrees of the compass rose, the display is conventional in its markings.
To the far right is the power display, labeled in EPR. Since this aircraft is a
twin-engine, there is a right and left EPR value that represents the power out-
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put for each engine respectively. The moving blue bar indicates power applied
relative to total available while a digital readout below each bar indicates exact
power for that engine. White chevrons on each side of the display indicate pilot
commanded power setting while two vertical blue bars represent actual power
output. These bars will lag the pilot command slightly and represent the nor-
mal lag time for the engines to respond to a new power setting. A yellow bar
parallel to the tick marks indicate the upper and lower recommended limits for
power.
To the right of the power display is a flap indicator and spoiler indicator.
Flaps will not be needed during the experiment, but the spoiler may be deployed
in any amount during flight to act as a speed brake in order to slow down. A
white chevron indicates pilot selected spoiler value, while a blue bar indicates
the current position of the spoilers. A yellow bar, if present, indicates a limit is
recommended for spoiler use.
B.3 Experimental Condition #2
This instrument panel provides all of the standard information a pilot needs to
control the aircraft. Added to some instrumentation are yellow bars that advise
the pilot of soft and hard maneuvering limits. Soft limits are shown to warn the
pilot that the aircraft is close to the recommended maximum value (the hard
limit). Maneuvering beyond a hard limit can lead to loss of control, structural
damage, or both. In addition, three additional displays provide information you
may not have seen before and are described later.
In the center is a conventional attitude indicator with miniature airplane
that indicates the pitch attitude of the aircraft. Labeled pitch bars show 10
degree increments while unlabeled bars indicate 5 and 2.5 degrees. Soft limits
are indicated by yellow bar that is perpendicular to the attitude tape scale while
hard limits are indicated by a yellow bar parallel to the scale. At the top of
the display is a standard angle of bank arc with tick marks every ten degrees
to 30 and then at 45 and 60 degrees. Soft limits are indicated by a yellow bar
perpendicular to the angle of bank scale while hard limits are indicated by a
yellow bar parallel to the scale. The limit bars are dynamic in that they may
change in response to other aircraft flight variables.
To the far left of the attitude indicator is a tape airspeed indicator. Your
current airspeed is shown in the marker box. The tape scrolls down as you
increase airspeed, and vice versa. A yellow bar indicates reaching the range for
maximum airspeed. A red “candy-cane” bar indicates minimum speed range.
In between the airspeed and attitude indicator is a new display. This will
show you the angle of attack during flight. A white bar will always extend from
zero, with the current value indicated by the end of the white bar with the white
chevron. The tape range stays constant during flight. Angle of attack is the
angle between the average cord line of the wing and the relative wind, or flight
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path. Since it’s directly related to lift, it provides a more direct indication of the
sufficiency of the lift currently produced. Although the range of the scale goes
to very high values, realize that the critical angle of attack is closer to 14 degrees
for this aircraft model. It is however possible to maneuver a swept wing jet with
engines mounted below the wing well beyond the critical angle and not realize
it. This is why the display can come in handy. This display is augmented with
yellow bars to indicate the flight envelope protection limits for angle of attack
as determined by the flight control computers. These bars can move, indicating
a change in the safe limits of the flight envelope. The yellow bar parallel to
the tape scale is the “soft” limit. In other words, if the actual angle of attack
reaches this value, you are close to stalling. The yellow bar perpendicular to the
tape scale is the hard limit. You should not attempt to exceed the hard limit as
the aircraft will stall. You should always try to maneuver your aircraft so that
current indications do not go beyond a yellow perpendicular bar.
To the far right of the attitude indicator is the vertical speed tape. Vertical
speed is indicated by a white tape that extends from zero in either the up
direction for positive rate of climb or the down position for negative rate or a
descent. Note that the scale is not linear beyond 2-thousand feet per minute.
Up to 2-thousand, the tick marks are in 500 feet per minute increments. Beyond
2-thousand feet, they are in 2-thousand foot increments.
Just inside of the VSI is the altimeter tape. Current altitude is shown in
the marker box and will show every 20 feet of altitude change. The tape scrolls
down as you increase altitude, and vice versa.
In between the altimeter and the attitude indicator is a new display. This
display shows g-loading in the z-axis. That’s the conventional g-loading you
think about when, for example, pulling back on the control column. Remem-
ber that as the g-load increases, the weight the aircraft must counter with lift
increase, and thus the airspeed at which the aircraft will stall also increases.
A white bar will always extend from, 1, the unaccelerated g-load factor, to
the current g-load as indicated by the white chevron. This tape range stays
constant during flight. A yellow bar parallel to the tape scale indicates soft
limits for load-factor while a yellow bar perpendicular to the scale represents
the hard limits. These limits are dynamic in that if other flight variables are
exceeded or close to being exceeding, the maximum recommended load-factor
will be reduced as indicated by the yellow bars.
Directly below the attitude indicator is a new display. This display indicates
the side slip of the aircraft in degrees right or left of the longitudinal center-
line. One way to think of what this display tells you is who much side-load
is being applied to structures like the vertical tail surface. In addition, in-
creases in side slip reduces the streamlined airflow over the wings and partially
blocks the airflow on one wing. If sideslip is occurring, a white bar will extend
from zero indicating the direction of sideslip. Current sideslip is indicated by a
white chevron. Sideslip can be reduced by applying rudder in the direction that
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sideslip is indicated; this action is similar to stepping on the ball in order to
maintain coordination. A yellow vertical bar indicates limits for sideslip. These
limits are dynamic and change as other flight variables change. For example,
as airspeed increase and approaches maximum values, recommended maximum
sideslip decreases in order to preserve structural integrity.
Below the side slip indicator is the heading indicator. Current heading is
indicated in the marker box at the top of the display. Other than representing
on 110 degrees of the compass rose, the display is conventional in its markings.
Immediately to the right of the primary flight display is a new display repre-
sented by a box with a tick marked cross-hair. This display represents pilot roll
and pitch inputs, both pilot commanded and flight envelope protection (FEP)
suggested. A gray box outlined in yellow represents the available range for con-
trol inputs given the current state of the aircraft. As the pilot inputs pitch or
roll, the blue dot will move within the display to indicate a relative change from
neutral input. The blue dot will have a green halo around it unless the pilot at-
tempts to use control inputs that put the blue dot outside of the recommended
safe flight envelope. In this way, the green dot will remain within the safe flight
envelope as an indication to the pilot how to adjust pitch and/or roll to return
to the recommended envelope. At the top of this display is an annunciation
of the FEP status. When the FEP is ready to monitor the aircraft status, the
annunciation will be yellow and read “FEP armed.” If the pilot exceeds any
monitored flight parameter limit, the annunciation will change to green and read
“FEP active” to indicate that it is now dynamically affecting the soft and/or
hard limits on appropriate flight parameters.
Directly below this display is a similar display for rudder (yaw) inputs. If
the pilot inputs a rudder command that exceeds the recommended inputs, a
blue line (pilot commanded rudder position) will exit the gray envelope, while
a green line will remain at the edge of the envelope indicating the limit of safe
rudder input.
To the far right is the power display, labeled in EPR. Since this aircraft is a
twin-engine, there is a right and left EPR value that represents the power out-
put for each engine respectively. The moving blue bar indicates power applied
relative to total available while a digital readout below each bar indicates exact
power for that engine. White chevrons on each side of the display indicate pilot
commanded power setting while two vertical blue bars represent actual power
output. These bars will lag the pilot command slightly and represent the nor-
mal lag time for the engines to respond to a new power setting. A yellow bar
parallel to the tick marks indicate the upper and lower recommended limits for
power.
To the right of the power display is a flap indicator and spoiler indicator.
Flaps will not be needed during the experiment, but the spoiler may be deployed
in any amount during flight to act as a speed brake in order to slow down. A
white chevron indicates pilot selected spoiler value, while a blue bar indicates
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the current position of the spoilers. A yellow bar, if present, indicates a limit is
recommended for spoiler use.
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